Despite this growth in green energy, Poland remains a coal powered state. Its consumption provided about 57% of Polish electricity in 2023 – compared with an EU average of under 15% the same year, according to Eurostat. Moreover, this is a power policy decision to maintain coal power. Between 20–25% of that coal is imported from Kazakhstan and Indonesia due to high domestic production costs, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

But the long-term direction is clear: coal’s dominance is eroding and a more diverse mix of renewables, gas and (in future) nuclear is emerging. In 2024, according to the IEA, renewables accounted for 29% of Polish energy production. This compares with 12.4% for gas and 1.35% for oil. A decade ago, in 2013, coal accounted for over 80% of generation, renewables barely 10%, and gas below 5%, according to World Bank data.

Unsurprisingly, Poland was responsible for just under 11% of total EU emissions in 2023, despite comprising only 8.1% of the EU population. Although carbon emissions have fallen by over 30% since their 1980s peak, Poland’s 2030 emissions reduction target of 17.7% compared with 2005 levels remains modest next to Germany or Denmark’s 50% goals.

Poland is engaged in a delicate balancing act between energy security and climate obligation, between the political power of miners’ unions and the economic logic of decarbonisation. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continuing, EU climate targets tightening and US nuclear energy companies drawing up blueprints in Warsaw, Poland has become one of Europe’s most closely watched energy laboratories.

In April 2025, coal’s share of Poland’s electricity production fell below 50% for a month, for the first time in the country’s history dropping to 49.4%. The country’s 22 coal-fired plants generated 6.5 TWh, down 20% from March and 10% year-on-year. The reduction reflected seasonally mild weather, higher solar output and weaker industrial demand, leading grid operators to scale back coal generation, according to the Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne (PSE) Data Portal.

Gas-fired plants supplied 1.9 TWh – up 44% from April 2024, while renewables generated 4.5 TWh in total, led by solar power, which contributed 1.9 TWh, a 32% annual increase. Wind energy accounted for 37% of renewable generation for that month, according to a recent European Parliament report.

The reduction in coal use reflects how ‘decarbonisation is a real policy objective in Poland’, but it is ‘consistently viewed through the lenses of security of supply and total system cost’, says Marcin Lutyński, Professor at the Silesian University of Technology.

Lutyński argues that the debate in Poland is not just ideological but infrastructural. ‘Public expectations around cleaner air and predictable bills are strong, but the pace of change must be calibrated to the physical limits of the grid. It matters, but it must be done in a way that keeps the system stable and the economy competitive,’ he says.

Coal still anchors that system. Yet, as Lutyński notes: ‘Renewables are increasingly displacing coal, particularly through rapid growth in photovoltaics and the return of onshore wind. Gas now fills the gaps. This is unavoidable in a system that lacks large nuclear power and still relies on ageing coal units with limited flexibility. The structural direction, however, is clear: gas as a transitional flexibility tool rather than a new baseload.’

Unlike Germany, Poland has no statutory coal phase-out date. Instead, the government has opted for what Lutyński calls a ‘managed glide path’, combining EU pressure with market mechanisms. ‘We should shut units when substitutes are real – new wind, PV, stronger grids, storage and, in the 2030s, nuclear. Anything more abrupt invites higher costs and import dependence,’ he says. In theory, that could mean energy imports from Russia, whose government Poland has every reason to mistrust.

‘Decarbonisation is a real policy objective in Poland, but it is consistently viewed through the lenses of security of supply and total system cost.’ – Marcin Lutyński, Professor at the Silesian University of Technology

European rules
In August 2023, Poland revised its ‘recovery and resilience plan’, introducing a REPowerEU chapter – in line with the EU plan designed to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Poland submitted an updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) in March 2024. However, the European Commission reviewed it in April 2024 and deemed the measures still inadequate to reach 2030 targets.

A key reason is that the new plan targets a 29.8% renewables share, which is below the EU’s expected 32% contribution. Poland accounts for 10.7% of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions yet reduced its emissions by only 9.3% between 2005 and 2023, far short of the EU’s 30.5% average cut.

Nevertheless, EU policy is forcing change through regulation. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) continues to raise the cost of carbon, while the new EU Methane Regulation 2024/1787 imposes strict emissions thresholds – 5 tonnes of methane per 1,000 tonnes of coal from 2027, tightening to 3 tonnes by 2031. ‘It’s not the end of coal per se, but the end of mining with high methane emissions as usual,’ notes Lutyński.

Public opinion split
Polish public opinion displays ambivalence over such climate-focused policies. In a 2023 Eurobarometer survey, only 28% of Poles – compared with a 46% EU average – identified climate change as one of the world’s four most serious problems. Nearly half of respondents expected national or EU authorities to act, while just 17% saw climate policy as a personal duty to change habits away from carbon consumption.

For many Poles, coal remains a symbol of security in a country that has suffered from foreign domination and influence between the late 18th century and 1918, then 1939–1989. ‘Decarbonisation means losing an inexpensive, reliable fuel,’ argues Władysław Mielczarski, Professor of Power Engineering at the Technical University of Łódź. ‘The economy cannot survive without dispatchable generation during dunkelflaute – those dark, windless weeks of winter,’ he says.

Mielczarski warns that rapid mine closures could threaten grid stability. ‘Hard coal will be required to keep the system operating for at least 30 years. EU regulations drive the move away from coal, but at the cost of higher energy prices and lower competitiveness,’ he remarks.

Diversification
Poland’s immediate response to a Russian gas cut-off in 2022 following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine was diversification. The Baltic Pipe now carries gas from Norway, while the Świnoujście LNG terminal – expanded since 2016 – receives cargoes from the US and Qatar. A floating LNG terminal in Gdańsk is scheduled for opening in 2028. Still, Mielczarski cautions: ‘Poland would need about 20bn m³  of extra gas imports to replace coal, a difficult task given infrastructure constraints.’

Beyond gas, two major transitions are underway: nuclear and offshore wind. Nuclear energy, despite long delays due to cost and politics, has regained momentum since the Ukraine war. In 2022, Warsaw chose Westinghouse Electric to build three reactors in northern Poland, with construction scheduled to begin in 2026 and first output expected by 2035. A second site, potentially involving French or South Korean partners, could add up to 9 GW. ‘Small modular reactors (SMRs) fit Poland’s industrial and district-heating needs,’ explains Lutyński.

Indeed, the government’s nuclear ambitions extend well beyond the Westinghouse project. A second nuclear programme aims to add 6–9 GW of capacity using Generation III+ reactors.

Meanwhile, solar power has become a breakout success in Poland: from negligible capacity in 2018 to over 23 GW by May 2025, now supplying 11% of electricity. This solar surge, however, has strained the country’s ageing grid. Thousands of new projects await connection, while existing output is sometimes curtailed. Integrating variable renewables will demand major investment in storage and grid modernisation.

Offshore wind is another key pillar. Poland’s Baltic Sea coast offers ideal shallow waters and steady wind. Joint ventures between Polish state-owned power producer PGE and Denmark’s Ørsted will deliver 2.5 GW by 2030, with an 11 GW pipeline in progress. ‘Offshore wind is expensive, because it requires new transmission links from the coast to Silesia. But its costs are socialised through grid fees,’ Mielczarski notes.

With strong, consistent winds in the Baltic Sea, the government’s Polish Energy Policy 2040 envisions up to 11 GW of installed offshore wind capacity by 2040, making it one of the largest planned build outs in Europe. The first major projects, led by firms such as Orlen, PGE Baltica and Equinor, are concentrated in the Polish exclusive economic zone near Łeba and Ustka. These developments are supported by Poland’s Offshore Wind Act (2021), which introduced a two-phase support system combining Contracts for Difference (CfD) with competitive auctions.

Beyond decarbonisation, offshore wind also revitalises shipyards. However, challenges remain as grid capacity, supply-chain bottlenecks and environmental permitting continue to slow progress.

Poland is also emerging as a European leader in biogas and biomass, ranking fifth in the EU for potential production, according to the European Biogas Association.

Poland’s hydrogen strategy, launched in 2021, targets 2 GW of low-carbon hydrogen capacity by 2030.

Complicated politics 
The political context behind this change remains complex, however. The pro-EU coalition government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, elected in 2023, promised to accelerate the energy transition but has struggled to pass key legislation. President Karol Nawrocki, aligned with the largely more nationalist opposition, recently vetoed a bill easing onshore wind restrictions, calling coal ‘a pillar of national identity’.

For now, progress on moving away from coal power is gradual but steady. Markets, regulation and generational change are reshaping Poland’s energy landscape. The old coal towns of Silesia are beginning to glimmer with solar panels and turbines now rise over the Baltic horizon. The next decade will determine whether Poland’s transition remains an experiment or becomes an example.

• Further reading: ‘How long will it take Poland to clean up its act?’ Poland has one of Europe’s most polluting energy sectors, relying heavily on coal for about 70% of its power generation – by far the highest proportion in the EU. New Energy World Features Editor Brian Davis reports on key energy transition initiatives and the challenges ahead.
• Find out how solar power is changing Europe’s electricity markets.