The solar industry has for years been embroiled in claims that its international competitiveness on price is based on state-imposed forced labour, notably within the Uyghur community and other minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. These tough allegations have been documented in numerous academic papers and journalistic reports, such as In Broad Daylight: Uyghur forced labour and global solar supply chains and Over-exposed: Uyghur region exposure assessment for solar industry sourcing, published by researchers at the UK’s Sheffield Hallam University’s Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice in 2021 and 2023, respectively.  

Over-exposed argued that the Uyghur region is a hub of production for metallurgical grade silicon (MGS), a precursor of key solar panel material polysilicon. The report claims to have found that between 2021 and 2023 the issue of forced labour has not been resolved. Rather, many companies have attempted to bifurcate their supply chains to comply with regulations and consumer demand, producing some product lines that include Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region inputs, and others that they claim do not.  

‘None of the companies that were engaged in state-sponsored labour transfers in 2021 has announced any changes to its recruitment methods or shown any resistance to participation in the PRC [People’s Republic of China] government’s programmes,’ the researchers wrote in the report.  

Indeed, since then, this labour transfer programme, which the US Bureau of International Labor Affairs claims involves Uyghurs being allegedly detained in camps and forced to work in factories, has only ‘increased in scale and the pressure on companies to “absorb” the workers the state deemed to be “surplus” remains high’, added the Bureau.   

Whether the Chinese solar supply chain, which is spread across China, and hence its international customers, have since freed themselves from forced labour inputs depends on who is asked. In terms of the US, the answer is no. In January, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) added 37 items to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, including five companies involved in the solar market. These include Donghai JA Solar, Hongyuan Green Energy, Jiangsu Meike Solar, Shuangliang Silicon Materials and Xinjiang Energy.  

Initiated in 2022, the UFLPA bans all imported goods from Xinjiang unless suppliers can prove they have nothing to do with forced labour. Four of the solar-related companies added to the ban in January are in Chinese provinces other than Xinjiang, but the US government believes they source polysilicon made with forced labour from there.  

In January, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) added 37 items to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, including five companies involved in the solar market. These include Donghai JA Solar, Hongyuan Green Energy, Jiangsu Meike Solar, Shuangliang Silicon Materials and Xinjiang Energy.

What is the UK’s position?

By contrast, in the UK, trade association Solar Energy UK highlights a new scheme that enables companies to demonstrate that their manufacturing sites operate in an ethical way, and that materials move through the supply chain in a clear and transparent way.   

At the core of the scheme stands a Solar Stewardship Initiative (SSI), which was implemented by European industry association SolarPower Europe and Solar Energy UK in 2021. The SSI ESG (environmental, social and governance) standard is designed to evaluate a manufacturing site’s performance in governance and business ethics, environmental impact, human and labour rights. SSI manufacturing members must commit to assessing two sites against the SSI ESG standard within 12 months of joining, by an SSI-approved Assessment Body. A Supply Chain Traceability Standard was published in December 2024 to demonstrate transparency along the supply chain, with requirements expected to be intensified going forwards.  

‘Now all the manufacturers who are members of the SSI will have systems in place to show where all the materials for their products come from, and if they are found to be non-compliant with standards, then they will be kicked out of that initiative,’ says Chris Hewett, Solar Energy UK Chief Executive.  

He adds: ‘What we’re seeing is that the vast majority of panels, which are hopefully all the panels which are supplied to the European and UK markets, are now free of forced labour risks.’  

Hewett notes that the toughening of the traceability standards is driven in part by the investment community and particularly pension funds that are funding solar farms: ‘They’re asking very tough questions around due diligence,’ says Hewett.  

‘Of course, the UK government and the governments in the EU are also very interested in excluding forced labour inputs from their renewable energy rollouts, as reflected by the UK in April amending the Great British Energy Act to enable Great British Energy [a British government-owned renewable energy investment body] to ensure forced labour is not used in its supply chains,’ he adds.  

The SSI board is made up of four categories, each with three seats and equal voting rights. Half of these represent buyers and manufacturers, while the other half represent non-industry groups, such as institutional stakeholders and independent experts, for instance Mehmet Bulut, Senior Energy Analyst at Greenpeace. 

What is the Chinese response? 

In China, officials have been flatly dismissing allegations of forced labour in the country’s important solar power industry, whose solar cell output reached a record 78.44 GW in March 2025, reportedly up 24% year-on-year. For instance, in December 2023 the Chinese embassy in the UK vehemently decried a BBC report that the British Army’s ‘Project Prometheus’ solar power supply scheme was suspected of links to forced labour in Xinjiang. It claimed: ‘Workers of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang choose their occupations according to their own wishes, sign labour contracts with enterprises in accordance with the law in accordance with the principle of equality and voluntariness and receive corresponding remuneration.’   

Similarly, a Chinese professor for public diplomacy in Shanghai who declined to be named in this article labels the allegations a malicious slander: ‘For those who are still making their living by fabricating stories against Chinese interests, [they may] make fun of themselves as they wish. However, if there is any real action against Chinese enterprises and against the regular trade relationship between China and the partners, China will retaliate with no hesitation,’ says the Chinese academic.  

This aggressive tone may at least partly be explained by the sensitive timing. The Chinese solar manufacturing sector has been mired in a price war and overcapacity since 2023, reflected in the record output statistics. While this is impressive, the value of Chinese solar cell exports plunged 21.1% year-on-year in April, reflecting lower prices due to prolonged oversupply.  

According to Chinese business magazine Caixin, China’s polysilicon producers are now looking to cut output to historically low levels, with average operating rates dropping below 40% as high levels of supplies and plunging prices hit the country’s solar supply chain. This could help international buyers who may have less pressure to demonstrate purchases of Chinese solar units are untainted by forced labour.  

How is Europe responding? 

In Germany, there are signs that a looser regulatory stance may replace the continually tightening trend that had marked the previous years. The new Christian Democrat-led government under German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is now reviewing the German Supply Chain Act (LkSG – Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz), which requires companies to respect human rights and the environment within their global supply chains. It was implemented in January 2023, with the scope expanding in 2024 to include companies with at least 1,000 employees in Germany.   

‘Article 7 of the LkSG stipulates that one must take action in certain cases within one’s own business area, that is, one’s own subsidiaries, but also with regard to direct suppliers, which is probably the constellation that occurs more frequently in the solar business,’ explains Daniel Roßbach, a lawyer and responsible for the area of LkSG at Germany-based law firm Rödl & Partner.  

‘It is not intended that the business relationship must be terminated immediately, but among other things, one must then sit down with the indirect supplier and develop an action plan to get this problem under control. While this may seem as if the current LkSG has not enough bite, it will likely have even less bite soon and could be a toothless tiger, given that the new German government has said that no sanctions will be imposed, with the exception of massive human rights violations.’  

A similar legislative move is under way across the EU, with the new European Commission of Ursula von der Leyen (another German Christian Democrat) proactively loosening demands imposed by the 2024 Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which insists larger EU companies conduct forced labour due diligence on their supply chains.  

Roßbach highlights the European Commission’s Omnibus Initiative, a comprehensive package of proposals released in February 2025 aimed at simplifying and streamlining several EU regulations, particularly in the areas of sustainability and investment, which provides for the postponement of mandatory implementation of the CSDDD, which will be phased in from 2028 under the new proposals.  

‘Until the turn of the year, the CSDDD was much stricter by providing for civil liability and obligations along the entire value chain,’ says Roßbach, but under the Omnibus reforms civil liability for offenders will be removed, leaving just financial penalties, he notes.  

‘The current winds are blowing towards deregulation, which perhaps has to do with a broadly conservative political trend in Europe and the fact that the economy is not flourishing as it perhaps should. At the end of the day, the wind can change quickly, and long-term predictions are tough right now,’ concludes the lawyer.

• Further reading:‘Europe’s solar dilemma: competing with China while securing energy independence’. In the early 2000s, Europe was at the forefront of solar PV production. However, as governments scaled back subsidies and incentives, they failed to compete with China’s state-backed manufacturing surge. Since 2011, China has invested over $50bn in new PV supply capacity – 10 times more than Europe. Making a dent in China’s production monopoly will be immensely challenging. But the EU could maintain leadership in solar installation and technology by strategically directing funding and diversifying supply chains, for example in the bloc’s upcoming Clean Industrial Deal, writes Charlie Bush. 
• Find out about a new initiative launched by SolarPower Europe to boost uptake for European-made solar products in high-growth markets around the world, in support of the rebuilding of the EU solar manufacturing base.