The Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee is currently organising the drafting of proposals for this plan, and relevant governments departments are soliciting opinions and suggestions from officials, the public, as well as experts and scholars.

On 30 July 2025, President Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (the Politburo) which decided that the fourth plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee will study proposals for the plan in October. Then, the State Council, China’s cabinet, drafts an outline which is submitted to the National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, before it is approved and officially announced and implemented.

Of key anticipated importance in this plan is ensuring China meets its needs for sustainable and reliable power. In 2024, the State Council laid out the path for China’s energy transition, stressing that China’s drive towards modernisation has generated new requirements for high-quality energy development. At the time, it commented: ‘Despite being the world’s largest developing country, China has comparatively low per-capita energy consumption. As the country has not yet completed its industrialisation and urbanisation, however, its energy demand is likely to continue growing. With an industrial structure dominated by heavy industry and an energy mix primarily based on coal, China will continue to face resource and environmental constraints in the long run. Energy transition is the fundamental solution to the above challenges.’

The FYP will underpin this progress and help integrate interim three-year action plans issued for sectors such as virtual power plants, energy storage and distribution grid upgrades. These plans are unusual in their period compared to typical five-year plans, indicating, for example, that conditions change rapidly, targets are exceeded or missed, or needs evolve too quickly for the standard five-year planning cycle.

Data from Singapore-based economic consultancy The Lantau Group shows that Chinese power consumption soared to a high of 1,023 TWh in July 2025, up 8.6% year-on-year. Industrial power consumption was up 4.7% year-on-year, rising to almost 600 TWh, and power consumption in the services sector was up 10.7% year-on-year in July, to 208 TWh. Topping the pace was residential power consumption, with an 18% year-on-year rise to 204 TWh.

‘If extreme weather or widespread continuous high temperatures occur, the pressure on power supply will increase […and,] as a next step, the NEA [National Energy Administration] will strengthen our monitoring of power supply and demand, enhance the peak-meeting capability of conventional power sources, optimise power resource optimisation, and use bespoke strategies to guide power supply efforts for each province,’ said Liu Mingyang, Deputy Director of the NEA’s Electric Power Department, in a press event to discuss power demand and supply during the July peak period.

‘We will make every effort to ensure the power supply/demand during the summer peak is both controllable and manageable, [and] firmly adhere to our bottom line of no power rationing,’ he added.

David Fishman, Shanghai-based Principal at The Lantau Group, notes that Chinese petroleum consumption and imports are expected to peak before 2030, potentially this year or next year, although forecasts vary and demand from passenger transport vehicles has already peaked due to rising electric vehicle (EV) numbers. Coal consumption may have peaked last year, this year, or may peak next year, with the power sector being the primary driver, accounting for 60–65% of coal use.

‘We expect the Chinese policymakers’ focus [to be] on increasing EV penetration, decreasing reliance on imported fuels – especially petroleum products – and controlling coal consumption up to the anticipated 2030 carbon emissions peaking deadline,’ says Fishman, referring to China’s goal to see carbon emissions peaking before 2030.

This goal is expected to be a keynote of the new FYP. He adds: ‘Electrification will be emphasised for heavy industries, such as steelmaking, to decarbonise processes by replacing fossil fuel-reliant heat applications with electricity.’ He highlights energy transition products as likely to receive more attention, including EVs, solar panels, wind turbines, data centres, IT, green hydrogen, green ammonia and carbon capture.

Fishman also adds that even though China currently approves 10 nuclear reactors (on average) annually, delivering 10 GW in output in total, making its nuclear programme the largest and most ambitious globally, that development would only replace a quarter of the current Chinese coal power stations in the next 30 years.

However, there might still be a big nuclear shift. ‘Currently, only coastal [nuclear] sites are being built, with inland sites on long-term standby, but industry contacts suggest movement on inland sites may occur during the 2026–2030 five-year period, potentially under energy policy rather than national policy,’ predicts Fishman.

What about changes to electricity markets?
Lin Zhang, Professor at the City University of Hong Kong’s School of Energy and Environment, expects the 15^th FYP period to bring a key shift through full marketisation of power generation, with all generators, including both coal and renewables, to compete in wholesale markets.

‘This means the business model will shift from a capacity-based approach to price-volume optimisation, which of course will force those uncompetitive coal plants to exit the market,’ says Zhang.

‘Some provinces, such as Guangdong, have implemented a spot market reform, which is likely to spread across the country during the 15^th FYP period,’ he adds.

Zhang also predicts that the coverage of China’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) sectors will expand during the 15^th FYP period. He foresees that under the plan, Chinese carbon reduction targets will become binding and well-integrated into national economic planning, which, in turn, will hasten industrial decarbonisation and stricter compliance.

‘And a number of inter-regional transmission projects [will] resolve the high curtailment of renewables in the north-west region, with all these signalling a strategic shift of China’s energy transition policy from capacity expansion towards efficiency improvement,’ says Zhang.

Similarly, Chim Lee, Hong Kong-based senior analyst, Asia (China) at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), points out that China’s electricity system, historically built around coal power, is gradually developing a grid structure and pricing mechanisms needed to accommodate greater shares of renewable energy. He notes that on 9 February 2025 the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the NEA rolled out a reforms for renewable power pricing.

Lee says: ‘A more demand-oriented market structure will be established gradually, ultimately benefitting the renewable energy and battery storage sectors.’

The challenge lies in balancing the green transition, a potential rise in electricity tariffs, and the stabilisation and security of the energy system as a whole.

What about energy security?
Qian Zhou, Singapore-based Associate Managing Editor for Asia briefing in China at professional services firm Dezan Shira & Associates, reports that in terms of energy independence, China is expected to maintain coal, crude oil and natural gas output near current levels in 2026–2030, while expanding strategic reserves and enhancing risk monitoring.

‘This approach reflects a recognition that, despite decarbonisation ambitions, short-term vulnerability to global supply shocks remains a systemic risk,’ she says.

‘The plan is also likely to intensify a “national chessboard” approach, aligning energy-intensive industrial clusters with regions abundant in renewables, as coordinated infrastructure upgrades, including grid interconnectivity, pipeline expansions and coal transport networks, will enable smoother energy flows and reduce regional bottlenecks,’ Zhou adds.

She predicts that beyond stabilising fossil fuel supply, China is likely to accelerate large-scale deployment of hydropower, nuclear and renewables, supported by advanced storage, alternative fuels and smart grid technologies. These measures aim to create a resilient power system capable of smoothing intermittent renewable output while reducing reliance on imports.

At the same time, Zhou predicts that China will update its Energy Law and Renewable Energy Law, coupled with market-oriented pricing reforms, ‘which are designed to institutionalise stability, reduce investment uncertainty and attract private capital into strategic sectors’, she adds.

‘China’s strategic pivot toward decentralised renewable energy systems, such as distributed solar, regional microgrids and energy storage, mitigates risks associated with centralised fossil fuel supply chains. Decentralised systems offer greater resilience to disruptions like cyberattacks, shipping blockades, or supply shortages,’ argues Attaurrahman Ojindaram Saibasan, Senior Power Analyst at GlobalData. ‘By incorporating these strategies into the next Five-Year Plan, China fortifies its national security framework, ensuring continuous energy supply during times of global instability.’

Dr Muyi Yang, Australia-based Senior Analyst for Asia at energy think tank Ember, adds that managing the decline of the coal–electricity ecosystem through the FYP will not only include power plants and mining companies, but also logistics firms, coal-chemical industries, service providers and equipment manufacturers. ‘Because this ecosystem is deeply embedded in local economies and societies, particularly in coal-dependent regions, its contraction will have broad social and economic consequences,’ Yang explains. ‘Designing policies to manage these impacts will be crucial,’ he concludes.

What does this all mean for global energy dynamics? 
Obviously, China’s continued success in developing renewables will reduce import vulnerabilities. This resilience is expected to empower China to pursue its geopolitical objectives.

As one of the largest importers of fossil fuels worldwide, declining Chinese demand will hit the country’s traditional energy suppliers. China’s refiners purchase crude oil from many countries, including Russia (108.5mn tonnes in 2024), Saudi Arabia (78.6mn tonnes) and Iraq (63.8mn tonnes) among many others. China’s primary coal import sources are Indonesia, Russia, Australia and Mongolia, according to the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy.

In terms of petroleum imports, The Lantau Group’s Fishman says that demand from passenger transport vehicles has already peaked due to EVs; and while trucking and aviation demand are still growing slightly, these uses are expected to peak soon.

‘By contrast, China maintains 100% self-sufficiency in coal,’ explains Fishman. ‘Imports making up only 4–5% of its usage, comprising primarily opportunistic imports like well-priced Australian or Indonesian coal into southern China. Nevertheless, the scale of Chinese coal consumption means these imports are important for Indonesia and Australia, (accounting for 2.17 EJ and 3.74 EJ respectively, according to the Statistical Review, which also counts Russia (2.49 EJ) and Mongolia (2.27 EJ) as significant suppliers).

Lin Zhang, of the City University of Hong Kong, predicts that China’s renewable technology export market will expand in the 15^th FYP period, in particular to countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially in Asia and Africa. Indeed, Zhang thinks some of these countries will look to copy some of China’s proactive pro-renewables policies with their own energy transition plans.

Chim Lee, of the EIU, thinks China’s role in supporting the global green energy transition will grow in 2026–2030, through its overseas green exports, investments and fulfilment of construction contracts: ‘Intense domestic competition is prompting companies to seek opportunities abroad, while tensions with markets such as the US and the EU mean that China is increasingly targeting less-developed markets,’ says Lee.

‘Chinese renewable project financing will increase gradually, as the country’s companies and financiers will need to balance political pressure to increase green finance while minimising risk exposure.’

• Further reading: ‘China installs new record of 24 GW in Belt and Road power projects’. According to a new report from Wood Mackenzie, this record number marks a doubling of the capacity installed in 2023 and defines the highest level of investment since the launch of the B&R Initiative in 2013. Notably, renewable energy sources, particularly solar and hydro power, led 2024 installations, reflecting a clear shift towards greener technologies. 
• China has 18% of the world’s population, uses 26% of global primary energy, emits 33% of global energy-related CO₂, and is by far the leading installer of renewables. The energy transition in China is critical to its future and to the success of the global energy transition, according to a new report from DNV.