Since Russia’s latest and most significant act of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the global gas industry has seen a remarkable shift in the flows of natural gas. In the more than 50 years since pipeline gas started to flow to Europe, a transcontinental pipeline system evolved, bringing huge amounts of natural gas from West Siberia to Europe. This gas trade was at the heart of the age of détente (the relaxation of strained political relations). But Europe’s growing dependence on Moscow’s energy was a constant source of criticism from Washington.

When the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union collapsed, things got a whole lot more complicated. Russia’s gas industry remained under state control. Gazprom held a monopoly over gas exports to Europe, which was its cash cow. However, the map of Europe had been withdrawn, and Russia was now confronted by transit states that were a growing source of risk.

Gazprom’s response, at huge cost, was to build pipelines to by-pass those transit states, first Nord Stream through the Baltic and then Turkstream through the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the EU, spooked by the various Russia-Ukraine gas disputes, changed the rules governing its gas market and strengthened the gas network to create a single market. At the same time, growing LNG import infrastructure provided access to alternative sources of supply, although Europe was largely used to balance the market when Asian demand was slack.

Fast forward to the spring of 2022. Moscow had already started to turn the screws on gas supplies to Europe, but in a short period of time pipeline gas deliveries fell dramatically. Not because the EU sanctioned them, it still hasn’t, but because Vladimir Putin changed the terms of trade, effectively shutting the Yamal pipeline that transits Belarus and Poland to reach Germany. Then, the Nord Stream pipelines were destroyed through an act of sabotage, and it remains unclear who was responsible.

This left transit through Ukraine and via the Turkstream pipeline as the only routes for Russian pipeline gas to Europe. When the transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine expired at end of 2024 that gas stopped flowing. Russian gas pipeline flows have now fallen from 150bn m³ in 2021 to around the around 15bn m³ that transits via Turkstream in 2025.

What has Europe done?
What has Europe done in the face of these events? Quite miraculously it has been able to pivot to importing LNG, largely from the US, as an alternative source of supply. It also enacted policies to reduce gas demand, which fell by 20% between 2021 and 2024. Europe has become an active participant in the global LNG market in competition with Asian buyers. But it also still imports Russian LNG. Europe also got lucky as mild winters and depressed Asian demand meant that it was able to enter each winter with full storage. This year may be different, but that’s another story.

How has Russia responded to events? In reality, there is little that Moscow can do; it has presided over the destruction of its most lucrative gas export market and Gazprom is in dire financial straits. Russian plans to expand LNG exports are also being thwarted by sanctions and Novatek’s LNG trade just got more complicated thanks to the ban on transhipments at EU ports.

Russia has long understood the need to find alternative markets for its huge gas reserves in Siberia and the Far East and, more than 20 years ago, developed the Eastern Gas Programme, Russia’s Asian pivot. It took more than a decade to strike a deal with Beijing to build the first pipeline. In 2014 construction started on the Power of Siberia, which this year will reach its design capacity of 38bn m³/y with gas now reaching Shanghai.

Moscow now wants Beijing to agree to a second pipeline, this time to bring gas from the fields in West Siberia that had supplied Europe. But China has also developed significant pipeline import capacity from Central Asia and seems to favour building a further pipeline from Kazakhstan. Russia’s problem is that China is also developing domestic shale gas production and has massively expanded its LNG import capacity making it the world’s largest LNG importer. In short, Beijing has options, Gazprom does not.

New uncertainties from the US
So, what happens next? The second Trump presidency has added new uncertainties. There is no doubting that the US LNG industry has profited hugely from Europe’s gas crisis. The expansion of US LNG export capacity from start-up in 2016 to world-leading in 2025 is quite remarkable and without it Europe would have faced an ongoing gas crisis. Further expansion is underway, and the Trump administration has lifted the pause on new projects as part of its path to ‘energy dominance’.

But, at the same time, President Trump has alienated his European allies and now seems to be siding with the Kremlin to bring a quick end to the fighting in Ukraine. Some in Europe are now even contemplating the return of Russian pipeline gas. There is also talk of reinstating part of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is certainly not in the US interest.

There is no doubting that the US LNG industry has profited hugely from Europe’s gas crisis – the expansion of US LNG export capacity from start-up in 2016 to world-leading in 2025 is quite remarkable and without it Europe would have faced an ongoing gas crisis.

Somewhat ominously, the European Commission has delayed the publication of its plan to stop all Russian energy imports by 2025, citing a changed geopolitical context.

There are many in Europe that hope the EU will stick to its convictions and carry through an all-out ban on Russian energy imports. There is also recognition that the long-term solution is to reduce Europe’s reliance on fossil fuel imports through an accelerated low-carbon transition. Come what may, the return of Russian pipeline gas to pre-crisis levels is highly unlikely, in that respect it is the end of an era. It remains unclear whether Russia can orchestrate a significant gas pivot also Asia, but whatever happens will have consequences for the global gas balance.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author only and are not necessarily given or endorsed by or on behalf of the Energy Institute.

• Further reading: ‘Power on the front lines of war’. Maxim Timchenko, Chief Executive of private Ukrainian utility DTEK, spoke at International Energy Week 2025 about the company’s experiences of surviving, and surprisingly even expanding renewable energy initiatives in a time of war, against all odds. Read highlights from his discussion with International Energy Week Board Member and former US Department of Energy Senior Advisor Melissa Stark.
• Find out how the expiry of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal has exposed Europe’s energy security.