The 26th UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP26), held in November 2021 in Glasgow, witnessed countries setting targets to achieve net zero carbon emissions. But, since these nations began progressing towards their net zero targets, energy security has suddenly taken centre stage.

India's 12th Five Year Plan defines energy security as ensuring an uninterrupted supply of energy to support economic and commercial activities necessary for long-term economic growth. However, a re-evaluation of the very concept of energy security has brought forth nuances around the ability of energy infrastructure to bounce back from economic, geopolitical and environmental shocks while also capping carbon emissions.

At COP26, India pledged to achieve a non-fossil fuel energy capacity of 500 GW and fulfil 50% of its energy requirements via renewable energies by 2030. These commitments improve India’s previous Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of achieving 40% of electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuels by 2030 and align with its goal of reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2070.

Experts have found a bi-directional relationship between economic growth and energy use in the short and long run. This correlation means that economic growth would result in and, in turn, be a result of increased energy use. Hence, as India continues to target high GDP projections, sustained economic growth and emissions reductions, the country’s energy industry will have to be mindful of striking the right balance.

In tandem, engagement with India’s energy infrastructure will have to reflect these ambitions. The energy system will have to be mindful of a transition that does not simply focus on building infrastructure, but also re-orients security discourse. The subsequent security discussions should be characterised by diversification of energy sources, supported by strong domestic demand and end-to-end infrastructure that is resistant to shocks.

Round-up of current energy production
India’s power sector accounts for the country’s primary share of energy production. According to data from the Ministry of Power, India has a fossil fuel energy capacity of 236 GW, with fossil fuel reserves contributing to 58.5% of energy generation as of June 2022. Here, coal occupies a whopping 50.7% share, with over 204 GW installed generation capacity. Trends in the use of coal in energy production have seen a rise in recent years, even against the backdrop of India’s commitment to ‘phase down’ coal, as codified in the Glasgow Pact agreed at COP26.

On the other hand, India’s non-fossil fuel-based installed generation capacity as of June 2022 is 167.7 GW, occupying a 41.5% share of the total capacity. Even though this number remains shy of the target of 175 GW by 2022 set under the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), projections by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) predict that the country will most likely reach the target by the end of the year. However, CAT’s assessment of India’s overarching commitment to achieve a non-fossil fuel capacity of 500 GW is rated ‘highly insufficient’ vis-a-vis what is required of India to maintain the internationally mandated 1.5℃ threshold.

Despite a decline in the utilisation rate of coal power plants due to a COVID-19-induced dip in energy demand and the ongoing shift towards renewables, India is still increasing its capacity for coal production with several projects under development and several more announced. The country’s coal capacity is anticipated to expand from 202 GW in 2021 to 266 GW in 2030, representing an increase in coal-powered electricity output of 6% every year since 2015. The launching of 40 new coal mines for auction in October 2021 is clear evidence of this. This step comes in light of depleting coal reserves in a country with rising energy needs.

Even with India reaching its 500 GW non-fossil fuel energy goal, carbon emissions are expected to remain at 3.8–3.9 GtCO₂e in 2030. An ambitious objective of creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3bn tonnes of CO₂e by 2030 will remain largely insufficient in absorbing carbon emissions from energy production. The situation is only aggravated by the slow progress on increasing tree and forest cover, increasing by a meagre 5,188 km² by 2020 under its NDC. Hence, instead of adopting a ‘burn now, pay later’ approach that employs ‘carbon dioxide removal’ techniques as reflective of the net zero rhetoric, India should vouch to systematically decarbonise its energy production.

What comes next?
With the imminent exhaustion of fossil fuel reserves and India’s high reliance on coal and oil imports, renewable energy sources have become more vital than ever before. India’s target of reaching a non-fossil energy capacity of 500 GW and fulfilling 50% of energy requirements from renewable energy sources by 2030 is a testament to its commitment to adopting cleaner energy generation. However, heavy coal dependence and a lack of adequate transition infrastructure appear to be the biggest challenges for India in achieving high renewable energy dependence.

India’s first step towards achieving net zero will have to be actively ‘phasing out’ coal instead of simply phasing it down. Phasing out will mean not only doing away with coal as a major energy source, but also removing it from the primary stages of electricity production via renewable sources; for instance, using steam for turning turbines in power plants. According to a recent CAT estimate, India could cut its national emissions to its fair share level in 2030 and prevent a quarter of a million deaths by retiring the current coal capacity early and reducing the pipeline of coal projects.

Phasing out coal must be followed by the diversification of energy sources with intense emphasis on renewable energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that the country’s electricity demands are expected to increase much more rapidly than its overall energy demands. India ran a 0.4% deficit in its energy production during financial year 2020–2021, with demand outweighing supply. In such a scenario, it becomes prudent for India to optimise its increasing renewable energy capacity and transition to a more resilient energy plan.

The Energy Conservation (Amendment) Bill (2022), passed by the Lok Sabha in August 2022, improves upon existing legislation for energy efficiency and conservation. The Bill aims towards the energy transition by focusing on renewable energy and green hydrogen. In a bid to ensure end-to-end decarbonisation, it mandates minimal use of fossil fuels and sets energy standards, even for end users in the transportation, industrial and construction sectors – three key emitters.

A step further than deploying renewable energy would be ensuring that clean energy emits fewer greenhouse gases throughout its lifespan. Hence, the emissions costs of setting up plants, acquiring and transporting raw materials, energy transmission and other factors should be calculated to understand the true impact of renewable energy sources. For instance, setting up solar parks in arid regions because they have abundant solar energy production potential has led to intensive maintenance due to the deposition of dust particles. A layer of dust can reduce efficiency by 40%. Moreover, solar batteries and panels employ energy-intensive raw materials with heavy disposal methods. Careful consideration of renewable energy placement and supply chains is important for a truly green transition.

The way forward for India
To sum up, India needs a resilient energy system based on robust infrastructure that must be replenishable and replicable to prevent fallback toward using fossil fuels. Such a system will be supported by diversity in energy sources to disseminate risk across multiple points.

Moving away from coal will not only substantially reduce carbon emissions, but also make India’s energy production domestic by shrinking imports. Sovereignty within energy security will be a direct corollary of import substitution.

However, India’s need to import high-grade and coking coal might challenge complete energy independence. Therefore, an effective transition discourse will have to incentivise non-renewable energy production by shifting investment away from acquiring coal and coal-based projects. In light of increasing energy demands, it will become imperative for India to counter a potential coal ‘lock-in’ and build enough renewable capacity to avoid relapse to coal-fired power generation.

Building renewable capacity, in turn, will have to account for value chains of energy production and other development activities to drive consumption. For instance, while promoting green hydrogen, adequate transmission infrastructure will have to be developed to support the end-to-end consumption of green hydrogen. The government will also have to incentivise producers and consumers by creating energy markets to increase domestic demand. The recently announced carbon credits market in the state of Gujarat could prove to be an exciting experiment in decarbonising private undertakings.

Nonetheless, a holistic energy plan will be incomplete without a collaborative effort by the union and the state governments. States should set local emission standards and targets to aid NDCs communicated at the international level. Local targets will address the disparity in the requirements and capacities of different states and prevent the replication of rigid, unsuitable models uniformly put out by the central government.